We analyse the relative performance of the IMF, OECD and EC in forecasting the government deficit, as a ratio to GDP, for the G7 countries. Interesting differences across countries emerge, sometimes supporting the hypothesis of an asymmetric loss function (i.e.
Introduction
In this paper we analyse the fiscal forecast record of the major international organizations-the IMF, OECD and the EC. We submit these forecasts (forecasts for the ratio of the budget deficit to output) to a variety of tests for accuracy, efficiency and unbiasedness, using data for the G7 countries, and, more especially, for the 'European 4' subgroup of the G7. * An important motivation for this exercise comes from the recognition that deficit forecasts are playing an increasing role in macroeconomic policy decisions. This has been particularly obvious in the European context where, for example, the operating procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact involve reference to forecast values of the fiscal deficit at more than one point. In an era of fiscal consolidation, this significance of prospective as well as of actual fiscal deficits is true more generally: so as soon as 'sustainability' is mentioned, the forecast path of future deficits has to be added to the historical record for evaluation. It is important to enquire, therefore, into the reliability of such forecasts.
There is also a more technical motivation for the work reported here. Implicit in standard forecast evaluation practice is the assumption that forecast misses exact symmetric penalties; hence a quadratic form for the loss function is routine. Recently, however, Granger (1997) has highlighted the fact that when the loss function is not of this form, the standard properties of optimal forecasts will not hold. The political context in which fiscal deficit forecasts emerge may well be one in which the costs of forecast misses are not symmetric; and, whilst the international organizations whose forecasts we examine here are under different political pressures from those * The forecasts in question are not derived from comprehensive macroeconometric models. They emerge from environments in which there is iterative interplay between partial formal modelling, committee iteration and judgmental discretion. Our analysis is based solely upon the official forecast figures and actually realized values.
which influence national governments, they are operating in a related political environment. Fiscal forecast errors may be especially sensitive ones. In this paper we use the fiscal forecast samples to evaluate whether the predictions meet the optimality criteria of non-quadratic loss functions.
In this paper we pay somewhat more attention to the set of IMF forecasts than we do to those of the OECD and the EC, for the simple reason that the IMF sample is somewhat larger than those we were able to collect for the other two agencies. In the next section we begin with a first evaluation of the IMF forecast record. In Section 3 we compare this with the record for OECD and EC forecasts. In Section 4 we evaluate whether there is any evidence in favour of an asymmetric loss function. Section 5 concludes.
An evaluation of the IMF forecasts
In this section we analyse the IMF forecasts of gross deficit ratios for the G7 countries, as published in the IMF's World Economic Outlook. † We consider both 'year ahead' forecasts, which are identified with those published in October of year t for t + 1, and 'current year' forecasts, which are those published in May of year t for year t. ‡ They are compared with first released actual data on gross deficit ratios. Such a comparison is most interesting from a policy perspective, and further revisions of out-turn data usually do not appear to greatly affect the results of related forecasts (e.g. Artis (1988) , Gallo and Marcellino (1999) ).
The year ahead and current year forecast errors, defined as actual minus forecast values, are plotted in Figure 1 . Note that in the official publications the deficit is defined as a negative value so that, from an economic point of view, a positive forecast error is made when the fiscal situation turns out to be better than expected. We will refer to this case as one of overprediction while, similarly, underprediction takes place when the fiscal situation is worse than expected (negative forecast error). From Figure 1 , there seems to be evidence of systematic overprediction for Japan, Italy and the UK, and underprediction for Canada. IMF fiscal forecasts for G7 countries will often start from a position in which the short-term budget projections of the national authorities are adjusted for differences in macroeconomic assumptions. Thus, the presence of bias can reflect either an institutional bias or, more likely, a bias in the national authorities' forecasts that is transmitted to IMF forecasts via the technical adjustments made to official projections. For example, in the case of Italy, the improved performance after 1988 is probably related to the approval of Law 362, that basically made forecast values the target for economic policy. Indeed, in general, it has to be recognized that a third source of bias arises from the fact that whereas the forecasts are made on the basis of current and announced policies, the actual out-turn will reflect, inter alia, subsequent policy changes. Unfortunately the exact definition of current and announced policies was not available to us so that it is difficult to distinguish among these three possible sources of bias.
The mean error (M), mean absolute error (MAE) and root mean squared error (RMSE) are given in Table 1 . The worst performance both on MAE and on RMSE is again for Japan, Italy and the UK, while the best one is for France, Germany and the US. The additional information present in the current year forecasts is useful in decreasing both the MAE and the RMSE for all the countries. We also run a Chow test for constancy of the MSE, by splitting the sample and constructing the ratio of the MSEs in the two subsamples which, under the additional hypothesis of uncorrelated normal forecast errors, is distributed as F(k, j) where k and j are the number of observations in the two subsamples. Constancy is always accepted, except for Italy, Japan and the UK, when current year forecasts are used. Similar results are obtained with Hansen's (1992) test. The mean error is usually smaller than one point, and the absolute error is only slightly larger. This looks like a good performance, but the unit of measurement matters. When the same errors are expressed as percentages of actual values, the typical range is ±50%. It is not always clear what the right scale to be used is from a policy perspective. Following standard practice in the forecast evaluation literature we will continue measuring errors as differences of actual and forecast values.
Since the analysis focuses on forecast errors of the deficit ratio, it is not certain a priori that we can assume normality. However, when we tested for normality in the distribution of the errors over all the samples used in the paper we found that normality was rarely (and then only marginally) rejected. Specifically, for the IMF sample used in the first section of the paper, only one marginal rejection (for Italy, year ahead) was experienced. For the later sample, involving also OECd and EC forecast errors, we found only three (weak) rejections in 24 cases (IMF, year ahead Italy; OECD, current year Italy; EC, current year France). In these circumstances we felt safe in assuming that the tests discussed below could be applied without modification for non-normality.
We now formally analyse the unbiasedness and weak efficiency of the forecasts. It is often (2)). a and b indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels.
claimed that forecasts are 'unbiased' when α 0 = 0, α 1 = 1 in the 'realization-forecast' regression
where a are the actual values, f are the forecasts, and u is an error term that under the null hypothesis of unbiasedness coincides with the forecast error (see, e.g. Clements and Hendry (1998, Ch. 3)), and should then be free of serial correlation. Yet, as Holden and Peel (1990) showed, (1) is sufficient but not necessary for unbiasedness; rather, unbiasedness should be tested for as the condition β 0 = 0 in the regression
where e are the forecast errors, and v are the demeaned forecast errors. Weak efficiency also requires the forecast errors to be uncorrelated in time (see, e.g. Clements and Hendry (1998, Ch. 3)). Table 1 reports, for year ahead and current year forecasts, the t-test for β 0 = 0 (No Bias), and a Lagrange Multiplier test (No Corr) for lack of up to second-order autocorrelation in the forecast errors, which is distributed as F (2, H − 2) , where H is the number of available forecasts (about 20 in this case). Weak efficiency is accepted for all countries, except Japan and the UK, for year ahead forecasts. § Unbiasedness is rejected only for Italy, Japan and Canada for year ahead forecasts, and for Japan and the UK for current year forecasts, with borderline values for Italy and Canada. Such an outcome is coherent with the graphical and descriptive evidence provided earlier.
The sample of observations on hand is relatively small and it is tempting to consider whether the country data sets could be pooled. The last row of Table 1 presents the results from the pooled regressions, which this time reject weak efficiency.
It is now interesting to compare the IMF forecasts with those from two naive models, a random walk without drift (which implies that the optimal forecast of a h is a h−1 ), and a deterministic trend model, see also Marcellino (2000) for additional results. ¶ Comparing the models using a deterministic criterion such as the Theil statistic can be misleading because the differences in the chosen criterion among the models may not be significant from a statistical point of view. Therefore, Diebold and Mariano (1995) proposed to base the comparison on the statistic
where
g is the loss function of interest, e.g. the quadratic loss g(e) = e 2 or the absolute loss g(e) = |e|, e 1 and e 2 are the errors from the two competing forecasts, and σ d is the standard deviation of d. Under the null hypothesis that E(d) = 0, DM has an asymptotic standard normal distribution. Note that if DM is positive, the loss associated with the first model is larger than that for the second one. Diebold and Mariano (1995) suggested estimating σ d with spectral-based techniques but, given the small sample available and the non-correlation of d j for almost all cases, we used the standard formula
Moreover, we apply the small sample correction suggested by Harvey et al. (1997) , and use critical values from the t distribution with H − 1 degrees of freedom. The results, reported in Table 2 for both absolute loss (M AE) and quadratic loss (M S E), are rather surprising. For year ahead forecasts a naive model achieves a smaller MSE than the IMF for all countries, with the exception of Canada and the US. The performance improves for current year forecasts, when only the forecasts for Italy, Germany and Japan can be beaten. Yet, we have to evaluate whether the loss functions are statistically different from each other. Actually, for § The year ahead forecasts could be considered as two-step ahead forecasts. In this case v h could present first-order serial correlation even under weak efficiency. Yet, higher-order serial correlation is present in the year ahead forecast errors for Japan and the UK, while the errors for the other countries are virtually uncorrelated.
¶ Fewer forecast errors are available for the deterministic forecasts because the parameters of the model have to be estimated. We have regressed the first five actual values on a constant and a trend, and used the estimated parameters to forecast the sixth observation. Both the estimates and the forecasts are then recursively updated. year ahead forecasts, the trend model only outperforms the IMF for Germany, while the random walk is better for Japan and the UK. For current year, the IMF forecasts are better than the trend forecasts for France. No other loss function differentials are statistically significant from zero, reflecting rather large standard errors due to the small sample available. A source of the problems of some of the IMF deficit forecasts could be the presence of structural breaks over the forecast period due to unmodelled changes in economic policy. This could also explain the good forecasting performance of the naive models, because of their robustness to breaks, see, e.g. Clements and Hendry (1999) . A possible remedy in this case is 'intercept correction'. The term 'intercept correction' comes from the practice of those forecasters who use formal econometric models for forecasting, of absorbing into a correction of the constant terms of the model's equations, persistent errors evident from their recent tracking behaviour. Here this method is implemented by adding the lagged forecast error to the actual forecast from the model, i.e. (2)). No Corr reports the (LM (2)) test for uncorrelated forecast errors (v h in (2)). a and b indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels.
see, e.g. Clements and Hendry (1997) . In practice, this or equivalent types of adjustment can be expected to be already present in forecasts from official agencies, but it seemed nevertheless worthwhile experimenting with this adjustment. From Table 3 , in the case of year ahead forecasts, it is seen that there is a marked deterioration in the weak efficiency property of the intercept-corrected forecast error. Actually, if the original forecast errors are uncorrelated, we are simply adding an MA(1) term to them because
There are also no major changes in the unbiasedness properties of the forecasts, which remain biased for Canada, Italy and Japan. The results are better for current year forecasts, when all the forecast can be considered as unbiased after intercept correction according to the No Bias test, even if some correlation is introduced in the forecast errors for Canada and France. The final question that we address in this section is whether errors in forecasting the deficit to GDP ratio can be explained by wrong forecasts of other relevant macroeconomic variables. A natural candidate is GDP growth. Unexpected growth increases the level of GDP and decreases that of the deficit (reflecting the operation of the automatic stabilizers); hence, growth forecast errors should be negatively correlated with deficit to GDP forecast errors. A negative effect of inflation on deficit forecast errors is also possible when the tax indexation system is not perfect.
This interpretation appears to be supported by the data. Table 4 reports results from a regression of deficit to GDP forecast errors on growth and inflation forecast errors (e g and e π ). For year ahead forecasts, e g is significant and negative for Canada, France, Japan and the UK. A significant and negative coefficient for e π is found only for Canada and the UK. A similar pattern also emerges with current year forecasts, but the coefficients are significant only for Canada and the UK.
In (4) we are adding the forecast error to the forecast with a weight of one. As an alternative, the weight can be determined optimally (in the sense of minimizing the MSE) as the coefficient of e t−1 when e t−1 is included as a regressor in (1) . Optimal determination of the weight does not affect the subsequent analysis; these results are available upon request. In summary, the IMF forecasts are weakly efficient for the G7 countries with the exception of Japan, but they seem to be slightly upward biased for Italy, Japan and the UK, and downward biased for Canada. Intercept corrections can improve the performance on the bias criterion of current year forecasts. In a comparison with simple random walk and trend forecasts, the IMF forecasts often lead to higher quadratic and absolute loss, but the difference is statistically significant for only a few countries in the case of year ahead forecasts.
OECD and EC forecasts
In this section we analyse the OECD and EC forecasts for gross deficit ratios, and compare them with those from the IMF. We focus on the four European countries in the G7; namely, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, both to reduce the volume of results to be presented and because these are the most interesting countries to analyse in the light of the deficit requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and of the Growth and Stability Pact. OECD deficit forecasts for all EU countries were analysed in Artis and Marcellino (1998) .
For the OECD, year ahead forecasts are identified with those published in the OECD's Economic Outlook in December of year t for t + 1, and current year forecasts are those published in June of year t for year t. For the EC, year ahead forecasts are those published in the series Economic Forecasts in the Autumn (October-November) of year t for t + 1, and current year forecasts those released in the Spring (March-April) of year t for year t. It should also be recalled that there are some minor differences across the agencies in the definition of the deficit, so that in the construction of the forecast errors we use the actual (first released) values from the appropriate agency. The year ahead and current year forecast errors are plotted in Figures 2 and 3 for IMF, OECD and EC. There are about 14 observations for the EC, and 19 for the OECD.
From Table 5 , the mean forecast error is rather low, in practice always smaller than 0.5 points, for both the OECD and the EC. The MAE and RMSE are smaller than those from IMF forecasts for Italy and the UK, with the EC doing better than the OECD, but over a different sample period. The IMF performs better for France and Germany, with the exception of current year forecasts for (2)). a and b indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels.
Germany for which the EC achieves slightly smaller values. As for the IMF, the larger information set exploited in current year forecasts is useful in decreasing both the MAE and the RMSE.
Author: please indicate footnote "b" in Table 5 As far as the weak efficiency and unbiasedness of the forecasts are concerned, the former hypothesis is always accepted for both OECD and EC forecasts; the tests are also reported in Table 5 . Such an outcome is similar to what we found for the IMF, when weak efficiency was only rejected for year ahead forecasts for the UK. Unbiasedness is also always accepted for year ahead forecasts, while for current year forecasts it is rejected for Germany in the case of the OECD, and for the UK in the case of the EC. For the IMF, we found that year ahead forecasts for Italy and current year forecasts for the UK were biased.
The results from this first comparison should be interpreted with care because the sample sizes are different; in particular, that for the EC is rather short, and the differences in the loss function may not be statistically different from zero. To address these two issues, we now apply the Harvey et al. (1997) modification of the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test, with an absolute and quadratic loss function, using for each comparison the common longest available sample period. We recall that if the statistic is positive, the loss associated with the first set of forecasts is larger than that for the second one. The results are summarized in Table 6 .
For year ahead forecasts, the IMF does significantly better than the OECD and the EC for France, while for Germany the difference is not significantly different from zero, even if the loss from the IMF forecasts is still the lowest. The EC performs best for the UK and Italy, but only in the former case is the loss differential with the OECD and IMF statistically different from zero. For current year forecasts, the improvement in the performance of all the three agencies makes it harder to distinguish among them; actually just one loss differential is significantly different from zero out of 24. However, the aforementioned pattern is overall still satisfied, with the IMF yielding a smaller loss for France, and the EC for Italy, while the performance of OECD and EC for the UK is rather similar. The results so far seem to indicate that different agencies can do better for different countries, the IMF for France and Germany, the OECD and the EC for Italy and the UK. We now consider this issue in further detail by analysing whether the forecast errors from one agency can be explained by the forecasts from another, i.e. we look for (MSFE) forecast encompassing, see, e.g. Chong and Hendry (1986) , Lu and Mizon (1991) , Ericsson (1992) , Harvey et al. (1998), and Marcellino (2000) . Harvey et al. (1998) suggested that f i MSFE encompasses f j when λ = 0 in
An equivalent condition is λ = 0 in
The latter is a standard forecast pooling regression, see, e.g. Granger and Newbold (1986, Ch. 9 ).
Hence, MSFE encompassing is equivalent to the irrelevance of the competing forecast for the construction of a pooled forecast. Harvey et al. (1998) proposed to test for λ = 0 using the Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic for E{e i (e i − e j )} = 0, using the small sample modification by Harvey et al. (1997) . We will refer to this test as the DM-HLN forecast encompassing test. The outcome of the DM-HLN test is reported in Table 7 . For France, there is mutual encompassing for the IMF and the EC, i.e. the IMF encompasses the EC, and vice versa. Both the IMF and the EC encompass the OECD, which on this basis seems to be the worst forecaster for France. For Germany-current year, the results are similar, while for year ahead, MSFE encompassing is rejected in many comparisons, suggesting that forecast pooling could be a useful device. The IMF does not perform well for Italy and the UK, in the sense that it is encompassed by the other two agencies, which instead mutually encompass each other. The latter result could be due to the small sample size, that does not yield enough information to discriminate among the competing forecasts. Similar conclusions are achieved with standard regression-based forecast encompassing tests. * * Summarizing, so far in this section we have analysed the OECD and EC deficit forecasts and compared them with the IMF forecasts using several criteria. On the basis of standard MSFE and MAE comparisons, the IMF seems to perform better for France and Germany, and the EC and the OECD for Italy and the UK. Yet, often the difference in the loss functions is not statistically different from zero. The performance in terms of unbiasedness and efficiency is rather similar across the three statistical agencies. When using forecast encompassing tests there seems to be, in general, an advantage of the EC forecasts, whose forecast errors cannot be explained by other forecasts.
In appraising the comparative performance of these forecasts, it must be borne in mind that they are not made at precisely the same times, and that the information set available to the forecasters is not identical. This also opens up the possibility of 'herding behaviour', i.e. the first published forecasts can exert a direct influence on later released competing forecasts, see, e.g. Trueman (1994) . Such behaviour can be rational in a highly uncertain environment, when the goal is a good performance in terms of the public's assessment of the organization's forecasting ability. If this were the case, we would expect the forecast errors of the IMF, OECD and EC to be highly correlated, and more so for the year ahead forecasts (when uncertainty is higher). Actually, this pattern appears to emerge in Table 8 , in particular for France and the UK.
Of course, other explanations for these results are possible, e.g. a different interpretation during the current year of the conditionality of the forecasts. The forecasts we consider here are all issued with the statement that they are 'based on present policies', a phrase which means that credible statements, e.g. of government expenditure plans already authorized by the respective legislatures will certainly be reflected in the forecasts whilst statements of ambitious targets, even from influential politicians, will be discounted (in effect) as wishful thinking. In a period when the achievement of fiscal criteria has been so strongly enjoined by inter-governmental treaty and peer group pressure, distinctions of this type may become more controversial. A vivid illustration was provided by the EC's November 1996 forecast for Germany's deficit ratio which reflected Germany's announced target; EC forecasters argued that the target itself represented 'present policies' and in the political circumstances of the time was not to be treated as falling on the 'wishful thinking' side of the dividing line. * * These results are available upon request. 
On the loss function
An assumption that we have maintained so far is that the loss function of the statistical agencies is quadratic. If this is not the case but the loss is a generic function, c(e), most of the conventional properties of the forecast errors from optimal forecasts are no longer valid. In particular, they are no longer necessarily unbiased and uncorrelated in time, and α 0 and α 1 in (1) can be different from zero and one, see, e.g. Granger (1997) . We now study whether a nonlinear loss function can be the cause of the rejection of some of these hypotheses for the IMF forecasts (see Table 1 ). Granger (1997) showed that the aforementioned properties will hold for the first derivative of the loss function, c (e), namely:
is uncorrelated with the forecast, i.e. δ 0 = 0 and δ 1 = 0 in the regression
Most of the literature on non-quadratic loss functions focused on the derivation of the optimal forecasts for particular choices of c(e), see, e.g. Christoffersen and Diebold (1994) . We follow a different route, we assume that the forecasts from the IMF are optimal for (the expected value of) c(e), and check whether the properties (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. We consider two rather standard choices for c(e), the asymmetric quadratic function c(e) = ae 2 e ≤ 0 be 2 e > 0, 
When b/a > 1 or c > 0 (b/a < 1 or c < 0) there is a higher loss from positive (negative) forecast errors, i.e. from overprediction (underprediction). For b/a close to one or c close to zero the loss functions can be well approximated by a quadratic function. We now have to choose the value of the parameters of c(e). We select b/a and c so that the empirical counterpart of condition (i) is satisfied, i.e. we adopt the values of b/a and c such that the sample mean of c (e) is zero. These are reported in Table 9 . The largest values of b/a are for Canada and France (underprediction is preferred), the smallest ones are for Italy and Japan, and the UK for current year forecasts (overprediction is preferred). This is a consequence of the values of the mean forecast error which is negative for the first set of countries and positive for the second one, see Table 1 .
We can now verify whether conditions (ii) and (iii) hold or not. From Table 9 , the noncorrelation of c (e) is always accepted for current year forecasts and it is rejected for year ahead forecasts only for Japan and the UK. Yet, this represents an improvement with respect to the quadratic loss results in Table 1 only for current year forecasts for Japan.
The hypotheses δ 0 = 0 and δ 1 = 0 (condition (iii)) are instead both accepted for Canada, for France-year ahead, and for the UK with an asymmetric quadratic loss function.
In summary, the assumption that the IMF forecasts are optimal for a non-quadratic loss function appears reasonable only for Canada, and possibly France, where overprediction seems to be more problematic than underprediction, even if such a conclusion must depend on our hypotheses on the loss function and its parameters.
Conclusions
In this paper we set out to review the accuracy of short-term forecasts of budget deficit ratios by the three major international agencies making such forecasts-the IMF, OECD and EC. Each agency forecasts twice a year and we compared a short-term and a slightly longer-term forecast for each of these agencies. A principal motivation for doing so was the evidence that such forecasts have come to play a more central role, especially in Europe, in macroeconomic policy adjustment than in earlier decades.
It is common in forecasting post-mortems to encounter the finding that 'balance' variablesthe current account of the balance of payments or the budget deficit-are by far the least well forecast values in the set of leading macrovariables of interest. In our case, however, we focussed on the forecast of deficits expressed as a ratio to GDP. This evidently takes care of the worst of the problem of forecasting the actual balance itself. Mean errors are usually below 0.5 points. And, whilst naive predictors seem to perform well relative to the forecasts under examination, the differences are not in general statistically significant.
The relative accuracy of the forecasts from the different agencies was also examined; no single agency is 'best' for all countries, but there seems to be some 'specialization'-the EC seemed to perform particularly well for Italy, for example. We noted that these differences might be partially explained by reference to differences in the timing of forecasts (hence, available information sets) and also by differences in the interpretation of the conditionality ('present policies') of the forecasts. (2)) test for non-correlation of c (e). Weak Efficiency reports the (t-) tests for δ 0 = 0δ 1 = 0 in (8). a and b indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels. b/a close to one and c close to zero correspond to symmetric quadratic loss.
As the deficit forecasts have been especially sensitive politically, we thought it possible that the symmetric loss function normally applied in forecast post-mortems might be inappropriate; but on careful examination we found it difficult to sustain this proposition generally.
